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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The  State  appeals  from  the  district  court’s  order  partially  granting  Brianna  Nicole
Andersen’s motion to suppress.  This Court should affirm the district court’s order suppressing
the incriminating statements Ms. Andersen made while interrogated, as she was never provided
with the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996).  This Court should also
affirm the district court’s ruling that Ms. Andersen’s incriminating statements cannot be used for
any purpose at trial because they were not voluntary, and their use would thus violate due
process.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately midnight on October 1, 2016, Officer Nielsen responded to a residence
in Coeur d’Alene “with the understanding that there was a male who was unconscious, not
breathing and unresponsive in the bathroom area of the residence.”  (12/1/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.4-18,
p.7, Ls.22-25, p.41, Ls.21-23.)  Ms. Andersen had called 911 for help.  (12/1/16 Tr., p.34, Ls.5-
14.)  When Officer Nielsen entered the residence, he observed “several people standing by an
open doorway,” and a young man, later determined to be Ryan Stebbins, lying on his back in the
bathroom.  (12/1/16 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-11, p.19, Ls.5-10.)  Officer Nielsen saw a used syringe lying
on the bathroom counter.  (12/1/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.7-10, p.26, Ls.5-10.)  The officer testified at the
preliminary hearing that he believed Mr. Stebbins might have been under the influence of heroin.
(12/1/16 Tr., p.13, Ls.8-16.)
Officer Niska also responded to the residence, and saw Mr. Stebbins lying on the floor in
the bathroom, and “two males and a female in the living room just kind of hectic.”  (12/1/16
Tr., p.28, Ls.19-23.)  Officer Niska testified Mr. Stebbins “was just starting to come to.”
2(12/1/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.14-17.)  Sergeant Schneider, also on scene, assigned Officer Niska the task
of questioning Ms. Andersen.  (12/1/16 Tr., p.42, Ls.3-7.)  The video recording of the incident,
which was introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing, reflects that Officer Niska
initiated her interrogation of Ms. Andersen by saying to her, “Why don’t you come talk to me.”
(Amended Motion to Augment, Ex. 1, at 2:52-54.) Officer Niska testified she “pulled
[Ms. Andersen] over closer to the kitchen and she opted to sit down . . . in one of the arm chairs.”
(12/1/16 Tr., p.31, Ls.15-20.)  Officer Niska asked Ms. Andersen for her ID, which she did not
have on her, and then requested her name and identifying information, which she called into
dispatch.   (Id., at 4:18-20, 4:46-5:20, 8:22-9:25.)  Officer Niska questioned Ms. Andersen at
length about what happened, and testified Ms. Andersen told her “they were downstairs in the
basement eating pizza” and Mr. Stebbins went upstairs on his own, and “they heard a loud
thump, and . . . they found him unconscious.”  (12/1/16 Tr., p.32, Ls.20-25.)
Sergeant Schneider joined in the questioning of Ms. Andersen after approximately ten
minutes.  (Amended Motion to Augment, Ex. 1, at 12:35.)  The first question he asked her was,
“So, you use too, or just him?”  (Id., at 12:50-55.)  Ms. Andersen responded that she had used
before but had been clean for two-and-a-half years.  (Id., at 12:55.)  Sergeant Schneider
interrupted her to ask, “Where did you put the dope?”  (Id., at 13:05-07.)  Ms. Andersen
responded that she didn’t have anything, and the officer would not accept her denial.  (Id., at
13:08-17.)  He told her, forcefully, “Stop it . . . no you are, you are.”  (Id., at 13:18-14:00.)  He
continued to question her forcefully and said, at one point, “You’re worried about getting in
trouble because you’ve got dope.”  (Id., at 13:58-14:00.)  Ms. Andersen continued to deny using
drugs and being in the bathroom with Mr. Stebbins.  (Id., at 14:00-29.)  Sergeant Schneider said,
3“More lies.  You were in the bathroom with him.” (Id., at 14:29-31.)  Ms. Andersen continued to
defend herself, and told the officers they could “search [her] stuff.”  (Id., at 14:54-15:03.)
At this point, Ms. Andersen asked Mr. Stebbins, who was also in the living room, if he
was okay.  (Id., at 15:08-10.)  She made a slight movement, and both officers told her, forcefully,
“Stay seated.”  (Id., at 15:15-18.)  The questioning continued.  Sergeant Schneider accused
Ms. Andersen of hiding the drugs and not telling the truth, and said “some magic heroin fairy”
must have hid everything.  (Id., at 15:18-55.)  Ms. Andersen made another slight movement, and
was told again, forcefully, to “stay seated.”  (Id., at 15:55-16:00.)  The questioning continued.
Officer Niska told Ms. Andersen, at one point, “Quit lying . . . enough with the B.S.  So, what
really happened?  (Id., at 16:50-17:10.)  Ms. Andersen then told a different story.  Among other
things, she said she had flushed a syringe down the toilet prior to calling 911.  (12/1/16 Tr., p.34,
Ls.5-14.)  At the preliminary hearing, Officer Niska testified Ms. Andersen changed her story
after being called a liar by Sergeant Schneider.  (12/1/16 Tr., p.43, Ls.4-23.)
Officer Niska continued to question Ms. Andersen, and asked for consent to search her
purse.  (12/1/16 Tr., p.38, Ls.4-8.)  Two plastic baggies later determined to contain heroin were
found in Ms. Andersen’s purse.  (12/1/16 Tr., p.14, Ls.9-21, p.15, Ls.3-6, p.17, L.21 – p.18, L.6;
State’s Ex. 1.)  Officer Niska arrested Ms. Andersen, and found two syringe caps in her pocket.
(12/1/16 Tr., p.40, Ls.1-10.)
Ms. Andersen was charged by Information with possession of a controlled substance and
destruction of evidence.  (R., pp.52-53.)  She filed a motion to suppress, seeking suppression of
the statements she made while being questioned, and the physical evidence seized from her
purse.  (R., pp.56-57, 59-72.)  The district court held a hearing on Ms. Andersen’s motion, and
the parties submitted the matter on the briefing, without introducing any evidence beyond the
4transcript of the preliminary hearing and the video recording of the incident.  (3/16/17 Tr., p.3,
Ls.3-11, p.4, Ls.17-22.)
The district court found Ms. Andersen “attempted to get up during the interview” and
“was rather forcefully told to sit down and stay.”  (3/16/17 Tr., p.4, L.23 – p.5, L.1.)  The court
concluded  she  was  in  custody,  and  suppressed  all  of  the  statements  she  made  after  that  point.
(3/16/17 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-6.)  The district court concluded Ms. Andersen voluntarily consented to
the search of her purse, and thus did not suppress the physical evidence seized from her purse.
(3/16/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-24, p.7, Ls.5-9.)  After the district court pronounced its ruling, the
prosecutor asked, “I recognize [the statements Ms. Andersen made] are suppressed but would the
Court mind making a ruling of whether those statements were voluntarily made so I’ll know if
they can be used for impeachment if she testifies at trial?”  (3/16/17 Tr., p.7, Ls.15-20.)  Defense
counsel argued the statements were not voluntary.  (3/16/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-16.)  The district
court  agreed,  stating,  “I’m  going  to  find  that  her  statements  were  not  voluntary.   They’re  not
useful for any purpose.  They’re constitutionally prohibited.”  (3/16/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.18-23.)
Following the hearing, the district court entered a written order granting Ms. Andersen’s
motion to suppress as to her statements, but denying it as to the evidence found in her purse.
(R.,  p.79.)   The  State  filed  a  timely  notice  of  appeal,  and  the  district  court  stayed  further
proceedings pending a decision in this appeal.  (R., pp.79-80, 81-84, 94-95.)
5ISSUES
I. Did the district court correctly grant Ms. Andersen’s motion to suppress with respect to
the incriminating statements she made while interrogated?
II. Did the district court correctly conclude Ms. Andersen’s incriminating statements were
not voluntary, and thus could not be used for any purpose?
6ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Correctly Granted Ms. Andersen’s Motion To Suppress With Respect To The
Incriminating Statements She Made While Interrogated
A. Introduction
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held a person must be informed
of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prior to being subjected to custodial
interrogation; otherwise, any incriminating statements made by the person are inadmissible at
trial.  384 U.S. at 444-45; see also State v. Henson, 138 Idaho 791, 795 (2003) (discussing
Miranda).   Here,  it  is  undisputed  that  Ms.  Andersen  was  never  given  any Miranda warnings
prior to being interrogated.  The question, then, is whether the interrogation was custodial, thus
triggering the requirement for Miranda warnings.  The district court correctly concluded
Ms. Andersen was subjected to a custodial interrogation after she was twice ordered to “stay
seated,” and thus correctly granted her motion to suppress with respect to the statements she
made after that point.  (3/16/17 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-6.)
B. Standard Of Review
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,
the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted).   “This  Court  will  accept  the  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact  unless  they  are  clearly
erroneous.  However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional
principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted).  “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
7factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).
C. Ms. Andersen Was Subjected To A Custodial Interrogation
The Idaho Supreme Court recently explained that “[a]s a practical matter, Miranda and
its progeny establish that Miranda warnings are required where a suspect is in custody.” State v.
Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404 (2016) (citation omitted).  “Custody is in turn determined by
whether  there  is  a  formal  arrest  or  restraint  on  freedom of  movement  of  the  degree  associated
with a formal arrest.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).  “The test to determine
whether a defendant is in custody is objective.” Id. at 405.  “The only relevant inquiry is how a
reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted).  Among other things, factors to be considered in determining
whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda include the degree of restraint on the
person’s freedom of movement, the number of questions asked, the duration of the interrogation,
the number of officers involved in the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, and the nature
and manner of the questioning. State v. Beck, 157 Idaho 402, 408 (Ct. App. 2014).  Looking at
all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation here, Ms. Andersen was subjected to a
custodial interrogation, as a reasonable person in her position would have felt a restraint on her
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.
Ms. Andersen was questioned by multiple officers after calling 911 for medical help for
Mr. Stebbins.  The officers suspected, from the very beginning, that Mr. Stebbins had overdosed
on drugs.  Officer Nielsen testified at the preliminary hearing that he saw a used syringe lying on
the bathroom counter and believed Mr. Stebbins was under the influence of heroin.  (12/1/16
Tr., p.13, Ls.8-16.)  The officers and emergency medical personnel were able to quickly revive
8Mr. Stebbins, but remained on scene to interrogate Ms. Andersen and the other individuals
present at the residence about illegal drugs.  While Ms. Andersen was not transported to the
police station, her interrogation was similar to that normally undertaken at a station, and her
freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
The officer who first questioned Ms. Andersen, Officer Niska, testified she “pulled
[Ms. Andsersen] over closer to the kitchen” prior to questioning her.  (Amended Motion to
Augment,  Ex.  1,  at  2:52-54.)   Though  the  physical  contact  is  not  clearly  visible  on  the  video
recording, Officer Niska’s testimony reflects her understanding that the questioning was not
consensual.  Officer Niska asked Ms. Andersen for her identifying information, which she called
into dispatch.  (Id. at 4:46-5:20, 8:22-9:25.)  Despite receiving no concerning information from
dispatch, Officer Niska and Sergeant Schneider questioned Ms. Andersen extensively, and
repetitively, for approximately twenty minutes.  The officers refused to accept Ms. Andersen’s
answers to their questions, and accused her again and again of lying.
After being questioned for approximately fifteen minutes, Ms. Andersen asked
Mr. Stebbins, who was now fully conscious, if he was okay.  (Id., at 15:08-10.)  Ms. Andersen
made a slight movement to get up, and both officers told her, forcefully, to “[s]tay seated.”  (Id.,
at 15:15-18.)  Sergeant Schneider again accused Ms. Andersen of lying, and said “some magic
heroin fairy” must have hid everything.  (Id., at 15:18-55.)  Ms. Andersen made another slight
movement,  and  Sergeant  Schneider  told  her  again,  forcefully,  to  “stay  seated.”   (Id., at 15:55-
16:00.)  The officers continued to question her, with Officer Niska telling her, again, to “[q]uit
lying.”  (Id., at 16:50-17:10.)
Considering the number and nature of the questions asked, the presence of multiple
officers, and the forceful and repetitive nature of the questioning, it is clear Ms. Andersen was
9subjected to a custodial interrogation.  Most tellingly, she twice attempted to stand up, and was
twice instructed to stay seated.  The State argues the district court erred in concluding this was a
custodial interrogation because “mere detentions—even ones that are ‘rather forcefully’
articulated—are insufficient to establish custody.”  (Appellant’s Br., p.12)  But it is clear from all
of the circumstances that Ms. Andersen was not merely (and forcefully) detained; rather, her
freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.  This is the
standard for determining whether an interrogation is custodial for purposes of Miranda, see
Huffaker, 160 at 404, and the standard was met here.
The  State  contends  the  district  court  erred  in  focusing  only  on  the  officers’
pronouncements to Ms. Andersen to stay seated.  (Appellant’s Br., p.12.)  But the district court
did not err.  The district court said at the beginning of the suppression hearing that it had
reviewed the video recording and the transcript of the preliminary hearing.  (3/16/17 Tr., p.3,
Ls.14-16.)  In a close case, the district court might be expected to discuss in some detail the
various factors weighing in favor of, or against, a finding of custody.  But this was not a close
case.  The fact that Ms. Andersen was, in the district court’s words, “rather forcefully told to sit
down and stay,” is certainly relevant to, and perhaps all but determinative of, a finding that she
was subjected to a custodial interrogation.  (3/16/17 Tr., p.5, Ls.1-2.)  There is no indication the
district court placed too much emphasis on this critical fact; nor any indication the district court
ignored the other circumstances surrounding the interrogation.  Because Ms. Andersen was
subjected to a custodial interrogation and was never provided with Miranda warnings, the district
court correctly concluded her incriminating statements must be suppressed.
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II.
The District Court Correctly Concluded Ms. Andersen’s Incriminating Statements Were Not
Voluntary, And Thus Could Not Be Used For Any Purpose
A. Introduction
While unwarned statements can generally be used to impeach a defendant’s testimony at
trial, see United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004), such statements “may not be put to
any testimonial use” if they are involuntary, as their use would constitute a denial of due process
of law. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979).  Here, the district court correctly
concluded the incriminating statements Ms. Andersen made while interrogated could not be used
for any purpose, even impeachment, as they were not voluntary, and were thus “constitutionally
prohibited.”  (3/16/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.20-23.)
B. Standard Of Review
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,
the standard of review is bifurcated.” Purdum, 147 Idaho at 207 (citation omitted).  “This Court
will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  However, this
Court may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in light of the
facts found.” Id. (citations  omitted).   “At  a  suppression  hearing,  the  power  to  assess  the
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court.” Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 562 (citations omitted).
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C.  The Incriminating Statements Ms. Andersen Made Were Not Voluntary Because Her
Will Was Overborne By Police Conduct
To  determine  whether  a  defendant’s  incriminating  statements  were  given  voluntarily,  a
court must examine the totality of the circumstances and ask whether the defendant’s will was
overborne by police conduct. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1991); State v.
Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214 (1993).  A court should consider the characteristics of the accused and
the details of the interrogation, including whether Miranda warnings were given, the youth of the
accused, the accused’s level of education or low intelligence, the length of the detention, the
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the deprivation of food or sleep.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Troy, 124 Idaho at 214.  The presence or
absence of Miranda warnings is a particularly significant factor. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S.
600, 608-09 (2004).  If, under the totality of circumstances, the defendant’s free will was
overborne  by  threats,  through  direct  or  implied  promises  or  other  forms  of  coercion,  then  the
defendant’s statement is not voluntary and is inadmissible. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285-87;
Troy, 124 Idaho at 214.  When a defendant alleges an interrogation is coercive, the State bears
the burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 489 (1972); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 685 (2004); State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873,
878 (1987).
The State did not meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
Ms. Andersen’s incriminating statements were voluntarily given, and the totality of the
circumstances reveals they were not.  Most critically, Ms. Andersen should have been given
Miranda warnings prior to being subjected to a custodial interrogation, but was not.  She was
questioned by two officers, at length and in great detail, after she called 911 to seek medical help
for a friend.  While the officers did not outright threaten Ms. Andersen, they made it very clear
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they thought she was lying and would not accept her version of the events.  At the preliminary
hearing, Officer Niska testified Ms. Andersen changed her story after being called a liar by
Sergeant Schneider.  (12/1/16 Tr., p.43, Ls.4-23.)
The State argues the district court erred in concluding Ms. Andersen’s statements were
coerced based solely on the officers’ fairly forceful initial disposition.  (Appellant’s Br., p.16.)
That State asserts “an initially forceful, increasingly cordial conversation, with no other coercive
factors identified by the court or shown by the evidence, is altogether insufficient to show
Andersen’s will was overborne or her statements were involuntary.”  (Appellants’ Br., p.17)  But
the initially forceful nature of the encounter is clearly not the only factor the district court
considered.  As discussed above, the district court reviewed the video recording of the incident
and the transcript of the preliminary hearing prior to the suppression hearing.  (3/16/17 Tr., p.3,
Ls.14-16.)  The district court reached its decision based on more than just the initial disposition
of the officers.  Defense counsel argued to the district court that Ms. Andersen answered the
officers’ questions “because she felt threatened by [them].”  (3/16/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-16.)  This
argument is supported by the evidence.
The State acknowledges in its Appellant’s Brief that the officers yelled at Ms. Andersen
during “the emotional high point of the encounter.”  (Appellant’s Br., p.16.)  The State contends,
however, that the questioning was not coercive because the yelling was brief, and Ms. Andersen
yelled back, indicating her will had not been overborne.  (Id.)  The State does not cite any
authority  for  the  proposition  that  a  person’s  will  cannot  be  overborne  when  they  are  yelled  at
only briefly, or when they respond to yelling by yelling.  Considering the circumstances of the
interrogation as a whole, which the district court did, the district court did not err in concluding
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Ms. Andersen’s will was overborne by police conduct, and that her incriminating statements
were thus not voluntary, and inadmissible for any purpose.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Andersen respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order
partially granting her motion to suppress.
DATED this 21st day of December, 2017.
____________/s/___________________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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